Security
Built to sit on the internet.
A browser terminal for your servers is a powerful thing to put online. Here is what protects it, and what it cannot protect you from.
Start with the honest part.
That is why the defaults are strict: HTTPS on a real domain, passkeys, and an agent that runs as a dedicated, unprivileged webterm user unless you decide otherwise.
A stolen password is not enough.
- Accounts with 2FA
Signing in also asks for the authenticator code, or is done with a passkey. A new passkey cannot be added without that second factor, so the password cannot be turned into a key of its own.
- Hosts marked “Require 2FA”
Every session, file action, command or update there needs a fresh passkey, authenticator code or SSO re-authentication; the account password alone is refused. Automation tokens are refused outright.
- The window stays short
After the second factor, the host stays open for 5 idle minutes and at most 60 minutes in all; then the terminal locks, shared viewers included, until you present a factor again.
- What it cannot cover
An account without any second factor, and hosts without the flag, are protected by the password alone; the Security card on the dashboard points out both. A device that is already signed in and inside its window is, for that window, you.
Getting in
- Passkeys
WebAuthn sign-in, with TOTP and recovery codes as alternatives.
- Step-up per host
Flag a host and everything there asks for a fresh second factor, never the password alone.
- Single sign-on
OIDC (Authentik bundled or your own) and SCIM provisioning; group-to-role mapping.
- Lockout and alerts
Failed sign-ins are throttled; new sign-ins and security changes are emailed.
After the login
- Roles and scopes
Owner, Admin, Operator, Viewer or your own roles; per host or folder; time-bound grants; crown-jewel hosts.
- Command guardrail
Admin rules that block a command, or ask for confirmation, before it runs, including in split views and Run on hosts.
- Shares that cannot outgrow you
A share or replay link never gives more than its creator still has, and dies when that access ends.
- Audit log
Who did what, from which IP. Tokens and secrets are kept out of it.
- Security card
The dashboard tells you what needs attention: a missing passkey, an open share, an old agent.
- Scoped automation tokens
Read or run only, expiring, capped by a role and a host scope, refused on 2FA hosts.
On your hosts
- Nothing to expose
The agent dials out. No port opens on the server, and the gateway stores no login for it.
- One token per machine
Bound to that host and individually revocable. Reinstalling an agent issues a new one.
- A client certificate per agent
From 3.7.0, each agent also proves itself with a certificate from your installation's own authority, checked during the TLS handshake. A client without one never reaches the gateway, and a copied token alone opens nothing.
- Signed updates
An agent only runs an update signed with your own key.
- SSH host keys pinned
A changed key raises an alarm instead of connecting.
Running it
- Encrypted backups
Daily, encrypted, and optionally off-host: Google Drive, Dropbox, SFTP or FTPS.
- Pinned releases
The upgrade script takes a version tag, not
latest, and pins it to an immutable image digest before it switches. - Release checks
The publish pipeline requires unit, browser and accessibility tests, a secret scan and a Python dependency audit. The image and npm scans run weekly, separately.
- Reporting a vulnerability
Privately, through GitHub. See the security policy.